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Some accounts of location leave conceptual space for a variety of unusual 
relations between objects and the regions they occupy, including the relations of 
multilocation and interpenetration. In this paper I show that countenancing both of these 
possibilities leads to a puzzle about whether an object can be colocated with itself. After 
teasing out the puzzle, I consider candidate solutions, and draw out some implications.   
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Few people seriously wonder whether an object could be located in more than one 
place at the same time, or whether multiple objects could be in exactly the same place at 
once. But precisely these ideas and others like them have enjoyed increased attention in 
recent analytic metaphysics,1 where some authors maintain that the notion of location 
leaves conceptual space for such exotica. Could a single object be multilocated—i.e. 
exactly located at multiple disjoint spacetime regions? Could two or more distinct objects 
be colocated—i.e. exactly located at the very same spacetime region? Can distinct objects 
interpenetrate—i.e. exactly occupy overlapping regions without sharing parts?2 It turns 
out that a number of venerable metaphysical theses, including classical mereology,3 have 
a stake in these issues, so they warrant serious consideration. What follows is a modest 
contribution to the project of assessing candidate answers to these questions. I begin by 
motivating the possibility of both multilocation and a certain kind of colocation, namely, 
colocation by interpenetration. Then I show that if both are possible, we face a puzzle 
about whether an object can be colocated with itself. After teasing out the puzzle, I 
consider potential solutions, and draw out some implications.   
Throughout the paper I presuppose the account of location defended in Hudson 
(2005) and (2008a-b). Location is a primitive and fundamental relation that objects bear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For discussion of these and related issues see Barker and Dowe (2003), Gilmore (2007) 
and (2014), Hawthorne (2008), Hudson (2005 pp.4-5; ch. 4) and (2008a-b), Kleinschmidt 
(2011) and (2014), McDaniel (2003) and (2007), Parsons (2007) and (2008), Saucedo 
(2011), Sider (2000) and (2002), and Zimmerman (1996) and (2002), among others.  
2 These are rough definitions, based on definitions that appear in the literature (e.g. 
Gilmore 2014).  
3 Cf. Kleinshmidt (2011).  
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to regions of substantival space, and the proposition that an object a is located at a region 
R has no conceptual implications regarding whether a is also located at other regions, 
including subregions of R, superregions of R, regions which partially overlap R, and 
regions disjoint from R. Nor does it have any conceptual implications about the location 
of any objects distinct from it. By following Hudson, we clear conceptual space for 
oddities like multilocation and interpenetrative colocation, but establishing their 
metaphysical possibility is another matter. So let’s begin by briefly surveying reasons to 
think that these relations are possible.  
On Multilocation 
Consider multilocation first. Some roads to the conclusion that multilocation is 
possible proceed via general theses about modality or modal epistemology, such as the 
thesis that conceivability is evidence of possibility.4 Multilocation is conceivable, not 
only in the sense that it is conceptually possible, but also in the sense that it is 
imaginable. After all, our imaginations often wander in the world of science fiction, 
where backward time-travelers have been known to meet their past selves.5 So if 
conceivability—construed as either conceptual possibility or as imaginability—is 
evidence of possibility, then we have at least a defeasible reason to countenance 
multilocation. Alternatively, one could appeal to Humean recombination.6 For example, 
Kris McDaniel (2007b) appeals to the following recombination principle in an argument 
for the possibility of extended simples:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a classic defense of this view, see Yablo (1993).  
5 See Lewis (1976) for argument that at least some such stories are perfectly consistent.  
6 On recombination principles, see Wilson (2010).  
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(NNC): Let F and G be accidental, intrinsic properties; let R be a fundamental 
relation; let x and y be contingently existing non-overlapping entities. Then it is 
not the case that, necessarily, Rxy only if (Fx if and only if Gy). (135) 
 
McDaniel argues that the mereological structure of an entity—whether a region or a 
material object—is an intrinsic, accidental feature of that entity. If he is right, then, by 
(NNC), there can be no necessary connections between the mereological structure of 
material objects and the regions they occupy (137). Though McDaniel’s interest is 
extended simples, this result also provides an argument for multilocation. For given the 
absence of such necessary connections, it seems that the whole (improper part) of an 
object, O, could be located at each of two or more disjoint proper subregions, r and r*, of 
a region, R.7  
Other roads to multilocation proceed by generalizing from specific, motivated 
cases. For example, suppose you take the side of the endurantist on the nature of 
persistence. Drawing on Mark Johnston and David Armstrong, Lewis (1986) famously 
carves out the conceptual terrain of the debate about persistence this way: 
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; 
this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different 
temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly 
present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly 
present at more than one time (202).  
 
So enduring objects are wholly located at each time through which they persist. On one 
way of filling out this view it follows that, if we live in a four-dimensional spacetime 
block, ordinary enduring objects like hippos are wholly located at multiple disjoint 
spacetime regions. Moreover, those persuaded by the formidable defenses of time travel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See also the recombination argument for multilocation sketched (and then criticized) by 
Gilmore (2014), which is based on McDaniel’s (2007a p. 240-241) parallel argument for 
interpenetration.   
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in the literature (e.g. Lewis 1976, Smeenk and Wuthrich 2011) can derive multilocation 
at a single time from the possibility that an enduring object travels into the past to rejoin 
its past self.  
Or maybe you are a fan of immanent universals. We are sometimes told that 
immanent universals are wholly located wherever they occur (e.g. Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz 2003 p. 54), so, e.g., greenness is over here in that evergreen and it is also 
over there in that emerald tree boa. Thus at least one venerable theory of universals 
entails multilocation.  
A handful of other candidate cases of multilocation have been suggested: fission 
products (Dainton 2008), transworld individuals (McDaniel 2004), works of music 
(Tillman 2011 and Spencer and Tillman 2012), and divine omnipresence (Cross 2016; 
Hudson 2009 and 2014 ch. 7; Inman forthcoming; Pruss 2013) as well as various other 
applications in philosophical theology.8 There are many roads to multilocation.   
On Interpenetrative Colocation 
Turn now to (interpenetrative) colocation. If the puzzle I present below concerned 
itself with colocation generally, then it would be appropriate at this point to consider the 
literature on material constitution, where colocation is frequently called upon to solve 
puzzles about apparently coincident objects like statues and lumps of clay, cats and heaps 
of cat tissue, and so on.9 But material constitution invariably involves colocation by 
sharing of parts or matter, and it is said that objects of the same kind cannot colocate in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The Eucharist (Pruss 2009), the Trinity (Effingham 2015 and forthcoming), mind-body 
dualism (Effingham 2015), and resurrection (Hudson 2010) 
9 This is discussed in Bennet (2004), Doepke (1982), Johnston (1992), Korman (2015 ch. 
11), and Wiggins (1968), to name just a few. 
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this way.10 If that claim is correct, then colocation in cases of material coincidence is not 
relevant to the puzzle I sketch below, which involves an object colocating with itself.11 
We should turn our attention instead to other kinds of colocation that have been discussed 
in the literature—cases of colocation by interpenetration rather than by sharing matter, 
where interpenetration is roughly the notion of objects ‘passing through’ each other, like 
a ghost gliding through a wall. (Zimmerman (2002) adopts the moniker ‘ectoplasm’ for 
ghostly, ethereal stuff that can interpenetrate ordinary matter.) More carefully, distinct 
objects interpenetrate if they occupy overlapping religions without themselves 
overlapping (sharing parts).12  
As with multilocation, there are two kinds of road to the conclusion that 
colocation by interpenetration is possible: roads that proceed via general theses about 
modality or modal epistemology, and roads that proceed via specific candidate cases. 
With respect to the former, we can run arguments parallel to those we considered in favor 
of multilocation. Thus we might take the prevalence of ghosts and their ilk in works of 
fiction to indicate that interpenetration is imaginable, and that might be regarded as a 
defeasible reason for thinking it is possible. Or we could appeal to McDaniel’s (2007b) 
recombination principle again, which, recall, has the result that there are no necessary 
connections between the mereological structure of an object and the mereological 
structure of the region it occupies. If this is right, then diversity of parthood between a 
pair of objects, O and O*, does not necessitate a corresponding diversity of subregions in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cf. Wiggins (1968/1997) and Sanford (1970).  
11 Thanks to a referee for pressing this point.  
12 Gilmore (2014).  
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the region that O and O* occupy.13 Broadly recombinatorial reasoning about the laws of 
nature can also get us to interpenetration. Gilmore (2014) points out that the 
impenetrability of ordinary material objects is presumably due to repulsive physical 
forces. If the laws of nature are contingent (a widely accepted thesis), then it is 
reasonable to suppose that there could have been laws that allowed those forces to be 
overridden. So the contingency of the laws of nature provides a further reason to think 
that interpenetration is possible.   
There are also candidate cases of colocation by interpenetration. Consider a 
round, green table. If the friend of immanent universals thinks that universals are literally 
located where they occur, then it seems she will have to say that roundness and greenness 
interpenetrate at the location of the table. Similarly, if the friend of tropes thinks that 
tropes literally occupy regions, she will have to say is that a roundness trope and a 
greenness trope interpenetrate at the location of the table. There may be cases of 
interpenetrating concrete particulars too, for there is some reason to think that bosons can 
interpenetrate (see Gilmore 2014). Like mulilocation, there are many roads to 
interpenetrative colocation.  
A Puzzle 
So there is a case for the possibility of multilocation and a case for the possibility 
of interpenetrative colocation.14 But if both are metaphysically possible, then, very 
plausibly, so is the following story. The main character of our story is a multilocated 
sphere that I will call Sam. Although I will officially reject this kind of talk below, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See also McDaniel (2007a) and Saucedo (2011).  
14 The forgoing discussion of motivation for multilocation and interpenetration is heavily 
indebted to Gilmore (2014), and also to helpful discussions with Joshua Spencer.  
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ease of exposition I will speak of Sam as having different ‘versions’ of itself located at 
different regions (just as we might talk of older and younger ‘versions’ of a multilocated 
time traveler). It will also make for smoother going if we assume a Newtonian manifold, 
but nothing of substance hangs on this. With those stipulations in place, suppose there is 
a sphere, Sam, at a time t1, and that Sam is exactly located at a region R1 and also at a 
disjoint region R2. As time passes, the version of Sam located at R2 leaves R2 and traces 
a continuous path through space until, at a later time t2, it comes to occupy R1, the same 
region that is (still) occupied by the other version of Sam. At this point it is tempting to 
think that Sam has become colocated with itself at R1. This temptation is especially acute 
if we imagine some obvious difference between the versions of Sam, e.g. that one is 
green and the other blue, for then it seems that at t2 a green thing and a blue thing are 
colocated, and yet in some sense both are Sam. If this story is possible, then, 
generalizing, we get: 
(1) It is possible that there exists an object that is colocated with itself.15  
 
An object that is colocated with itself (let’s call this relation self-colocation) would be 
unusual. We don’t think that the objects in our everyday experience are colocated with 
themselves. Neither do we think that they are multilocated. Rather, we take the ordinary 
objects in our experience to be exactly located at a single region, and that’s it. No 
multilocation, no interpenetration, and certainly no self-colocation. A world just like ours 
in all respects except that all hippopotami are self-colocated would be a relationally 
different world. Similarly, there is a metaphysical difference between Sam’s world at t2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Although I haven’t seen self-colocation discussed in print, others have thought about it. 
Thought experiments involving self-colocating time travelling ghosts seem to crop up 
every now and then in metaphysics circles.  
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as described in our story and a world where Sam is exactly located at R1 at t2 and is not 
multilocated or self-colocated. Let’s say that such an object is singularly located. Given 
the forgoing, it looks like the following is true: 
(2) If it is possible that there exists an object that is colocated with itself, then there is 
a metaphysical difference between an object’s being self-colocated and that same 
object’s being singularly located.  
 
Very well. But if (2) is true, then what is the metaphysical difference between Sam’s 
being self-colocated and Sam’s being singularly located? This turns out to be a very 
difficult question to answer. Intuitively, if an object is multilocated at R1 and R2, then 
this is true in virtue of the fact that it is located simpliciter at R1 and the fact that it is 
located simpliciter at R2. Similarly, if two objects a and b are colocated at R1, this is true 
in virtue of the fact that a is located simpliciter at R1 and the fact that b is located 
simpliciter at R1. Facts about multilocation and colocation hold in virtue of facts about 
location simpliciter. Therefore, if an object like Sam is colocated with itself at R1, this 
holds in virtue of facts about the location simpliciter of an object or objects. What facts 
are these? The fact that Sam is located at R1 and the fact that… Sam is located at R1. But 
those are the same fact, so all we really have is the fact that Sam is located at R1. And 
surely that is what it is for Sam to be singularly located at R1. So it seems as though 
(3) There is no metaphysical difference between an object’s being self-colocated, and 
that same object’s being singularly located.  
 
And now we have a problem. (1) and (2) clearly entail the negation of (3), so we have an 
inconsistent triad. But all three propositions in the triad seem, prima facie, to be true. So 
which one should we give up?  
Denying (3) 
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 Let’s take them in reverse order. My use of ‘version’ language above suggests an 
initially tempting way to reject (3). There is a metaphysical difference between singular 
location and self-colocation, one might insist, because in singular location there is just 
one version of Sam located at R1, whereas in self-colocation there are two. An immediate 
question here is what to make of ‘versions.’ What exactly are they? Obviously it will not 
help to think of them as region-indexed objects (Sam-at-R1; Sam-at-R2), since both 
versions of Sam occupy the same region when Sam is self-colocated. But can we 
construe them as temporal parts or stages? Theodore Sider has argued16 that the 
perdurantist ontology of persistence nicely explains the multilocation of backward time 
travelers by identifying the younger and older versions of the time traveler with distinct 
temporal parts or person-stages of the same individual.17 Perhaps this also gives us a way 
to make sense of the suggestion that there are two versions of Sam that colocate at t2. For 
if we suppose that Sam is a backward time-traveler, then there can be more than one 
temporal part or stage of Sam at a given moment of external time,18 and we can construe 
Sam’s being self-colocated at t2 as Sam’s having distinct but colocated temporal parts or 
stages at t2.  
 We might worry that temporal parts or stages amount to nothing more than 
unusual spatial parts when they exist simultaneously, and that a case of colocated spatial 
parts seems to be a case of ‘ordinary’ colocation rather than self-colocation. While this 
might be cause for concern, I will not make much of this worry because I think the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Sider (2001) pp. 101-109. See also Markosian’s (2004) critical discussion of this 
argument (pp. 665-673). 
17 Sider (2001 p. 101) prefers person stages, partly because his definition of temporal 
parts rules out an object having more than one non-overlapping temporal part at the same 
time. 
18 The term comes from Lewis (1976).   
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perdurantist can push back by emphasizing the temporal, causal, and similarity relations 
of such would-be temporal parts to earlier and later temporal parts/stages. In other words, 
these are not your ordinary spatial parts—they are much better candidates for genuine 
versions of a single object than ‘ordinary’ spatial parts like arms and legs.   
There are more pressing concerns. For example, if multilocation is metaphysically 
possible, then it is far from obvious, even doubtful, that it requires time travel, for as we 
have seen, there are lots of candidate cases of multilocation aside from backward time 
travelers. If multilocation does not require time travel, then perdurantism cannot give us a 
fully general solution to our puzzle about self-colocation.  
The most serious problem with the perdurantist solution, however, is 
perdurantism itself.19 Although this theory of persistence has able defenders,20 it is deeply 
counterintuitive. Our commonsense view of persistence has it that ordinary objects exist 
wholly—not just partly—at each time through which they persist. Moreover, 
perdurantism doesn’t seem to capture the dynamic nature of change. Change over time 
for the perdurantist is closely analogous to the static notion of variation across space. For 
example, growing taller is, on the perdurantist view, a matter of having increasingly tall 
parts or stages along the temporal dimension. A hypothesis with such counterintuitive 
consequences requires robust motivation, but perdurantism falls short in this regard too.21 
Prima facie, some of the strongest arguments for perdurantism highlight its ability to 
solve metaphysical puzzles about coincidence and vagueness, but it turns out that these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The following criticisms of perdurantism are fairly standard; I make no claims to 
originality. For another interesting critique that I do not mention in the text, see van 
Inwagen (1981).  
20 E.g., Heller (1984), Hudson (2005), Lewis (1986) pp. 202-204, and Sider (2001).  
21 Cf Rea (1998).  
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puzzles have variants that are immune to the usual perdurantist solutions.22 For all of 
these reasons, temporal parts will not be our salvation.  
How else might we cash out versions? On some metaphysical views, colocation is 
the rule rather than the exception; objects are regularly colocated with other, similar 
objects that might be natural candidates to play the role of versions. For example, 
consider Jeffrey Brower’s (2010) neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem of temporary 
intrinsics.23 To explain how a changing object can have apparently incompatible 
properties at different times, Brower proposes that, e.g., seated Socrates and standing 
Socrates are in fact different objects fixed at different times, while Socrates himself 
persists by successively entering into (and colocating with) these objects. Maybe we 
could say that persisting Socrates and seated Socrates each qualify as versions of 
Socrates, and that Socrates is located wherever his versions are located. Then, when 
Socrates is sitting, he is self-colocated.24  
One problem with this kind of strategy is that it makes self-colocation too 
common and humdrum, whereas singular location becomes a rare beast. On the account 
just sketched, having a temporary intrinsic property is sufficient for being self-colocated, 
and so it becomes difficult to imagine a situation in which an ordinary object would not 
be self-colocated. Even in our story about Sam, provided that it has at least one 
temporary intrinsic property, Sam is self-colocated before its versions come together at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For a recent (albeit brief) discussion of vagueness puzzles that are not conducive to 
perdurantist solutions, see Korman (2015) pp. 166-167. On puzzles of coincidence, in 
addition to cases where coincident objects share all of their temporal as well as spatial 
parts, Gilmore (2007) argues that some possible cases can be solved only by the 
endurantist. For further discussion, see Eagle (2010a-b) and Gilmore (2010). 
23 For a helpful overview of this problem, see Haslanger (2003). 
24 Other views like Hawthorne (2008) and Fine (2010) could perhaps be developed in a 
similar ways.  
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R1 at t2. Singular location, on the other hand, turns out to be a fairly remote possibility if 
it is possible at all, which seems to get things backwards. A related problem is that we 
end up with too many versions. At the end of our story about Sam, we thought we had 
just two colocated versions of Sam, but on the account of versions sketched in the 
previous paragraph, there will be at least as many colocated versions of Sam at t2 as there 
are temporary intrinsics instantiated by Sam at t2. It seems the only hope for solving 
these problems is a principled distinction that allows only a select few of these objects to 
qualify as versions, but it is not obvious that there is any such distinction to be had. Still 
another problem with the present suggestion is that, if self-colocation occurs only when 
an object like Socrates takes on a temporary intrinsic property by colocating with some 
appropriate, intrinsically different object like seated Socrates, then no case of colocation 
will involve colocation of objects that are intrinsically exactly alike. But we could easily 
stipulate that the versions of Sam in our story, instead of being different colors, are in fact 
instrinsic duplicates. So this account of versions will not do.  
Furthermore, there is a sense in which all of these attempts to spell out the notion 
of versions cheat: on all of these views, versions are distinct (non-identical) objects, so 
when they colocate the result is not self-colocation in the most literal, full-blooded sense, 
but rather a variety of ‘ordinary’ colocation. This criticism betrays my more general 
suspicion that appealing to versions is fundamentally misguided. Version talk is 
sometimes useful and maybe even practically indispensable in certain contexts, but it is 
also false: there are no such things as versions. To see this, consider Sam at t1, when Sam 
is multilocated. Prima facie, to say that Sam is multilocated at t1 is not to say that there is 
a version of Sam at R1 and another version of Sam at R2. It is rather to say that Sam is 
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located at R1 and that Sam is located at R2. That’s what multilocation means. To reify 
talk of versions of objects in contexts like these is just confused. Versions, therefore, do 
not solve our puzzle.  
 Here is a different attempt to deny (3). We could postulate tropes25 or particular 
instances of the location relation, and then claim that in singular location, there is just one 
trope (or instance) of the located at relation uniting Sam to R1, but in the case of self-
colocation there are two tropes (or instances) of the located at relation uniting Sam to R1. 
An obvious drawback of this proposal is its metaphysical commitments. If we are not 
happy being tied to tropes/instances of the location relation, then we ought to look 
elsewhere for a solution to our puzzle. A further problem is how to make sense of the 
idea that two location tropes unite a single object and region. What distinguishes these 
two tropes from each other? We cannot distinguish them by appealing to their locations, 
since they are colocated, and we cannot distinguish them by appealing to the relata they 
unite, since they unite exactly the same relata. Therefore, taking this road might commit 
us not only to tropes of the location relation, but also to a primitivist account of their 
individuation. Although many trope theorists bite this bullet,26 this ought to make the 
present strategy even less attractive.  
 Still another attempt to reject (3) appeals to Sam’s history. Sam would be merely 
singularly located at R1 at time t2, but for the fact that at t1 Sam was multilocated, and 
subsequently moved in the way detailed in our story. It is this prior history in virtue of 
which Sam is self-colocated rather than singularly located at R1 at t2. There are at least 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For an extended defense of trope theory, see Ehring (2011).   
26 Cf. the discussion of trope individuation in Maurin (2014).  
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two problems with this suggestion, however. The first is that, intuitively, what makes it 
the case that Sam is self-colocated at R1 at t2 are facts about Sam and Sam’s location at 
t2. Appealing to an object’s history to account for the difference between singular 
location and self-colocation seems to be looking for an explanation in the wrong place. A 
second problem is that our story about Sam can simply be revised to circumvent this 
objection. For if self-colocation is possible, then it is plausible that Sam could have been 
self-colocated for as long as it has existed, and there is no history to distinguish this from 
a case where Sam has been singularly located for as long as it has existed.  
Denying (2) 
 Perhaps the time has come to reconsider (2). A radical way out of our puzzle 
would be to deny that there is any difference at all between singular location and self-
colocation. But unless this is intended as the claim that self-colocation is impossible 
because it collapses into singular location—which I take to be a rejection of (1) rather 
than (2)—it is obviously false. The fire hydrant on the sidewalk outside is singularly 
located. It is not self-colocated. So singular location is not self-colocation. And it is 
equally obvious that the difference between the two relations, whatever exactly it 
amounts to, is a robustly metaphysical difference—it is not, e.g., mind-dependent. So we 
cannot deny that there is a difference between singular location and self-colocation, and 
we cannot say that the difference is non-metaphysical. It follows that there is a 
metaphysical difference between singular location and self-colocation. Therefore (2) is 
true.  
Maybe some will be willing to say that it is a brute fact that a self-colocated 
object is self-colocated rather than singularly located, but this is costly. For self-
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colocation is a special case of colocation, and, intuitively, facts about colocation hold in 
virtue of facts about location simpliciter. It would be odd if self-colocation were an 
exception to this general point. For that reason, the fact that a self-colocated object is 
self-colocated is not likely a brute fact. So I can see no viable way out of (2).   
Denying (1) 
 That leaves (1). At this point, (1) is under serious pressure, for it is starting to look 
like self-colocation is just incoherent; colocation seems to collapse into singular location 
when the colocated objects are numerically identical. And yet, if multilocation is 
possible, then there seems to be nothing wrong with the initial setup of our story about 
Sam, and if interpenetration is possible as well, it is hard to see what could, of 
metaphysical necessity, keep Sam from moving from R2 to R1.   
One option remains. Although it is not impossible for Sam to move from R2 to 
R1, we were mistaken to think that when the ‘versions’ of Sam converge in our story, 
Sam self-colocates. Instead of self-colocating, when the R2 version arrives at R1, we 
should suppose that Sam simply ‘un-multilocates’ and becomes singularly located. In 
fact, I suspect that any temptation to think otherwise is the result of tacitly reifying 
versions. For when we think of there being a version of Sam at R1 and another version of 
Sam at R2, it is natural to suppose that when the R2 version travels to the location of the 
R1 version, ‘they’ (the versions) become colocated at R1. But when we take seriously the 
fact that it is just Sam at R1 and it is just Sam at R2 (not distinct versions or aspects or 
whatever), then it is no longer tempting to say that, when Sam moves in such a way as to 
be located only at R1, there is any kind of colocation going on at all. So (1) is, on 
reflection, false. Problem solved.  
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Unfortunately, we have solved one puzzle only to stumble into another. For 
suppose once again that at t1 Sam is green at R1 and blue at R2. What color will Sam be 
when the green and blue versions converge and unmultilocate? Presumably, a singularly 
located sphere cannot be both green all over and blue all over, so it looks like we will 
have to say that it ceases to be one of those colors, and which one it ceases to be is just a 
brute fact. If we are uncomfortable with this sort of bruteness (and no doubt some will 
be), the other option is to deny that this kind of situation can even arise, which probably 
means denying either that multilocation is possible, or that interpenetration is possible, or 
both—something we have so far managed to avoid.27 Of course, both multilocation and 
interpenetration are controversial and clash with pre-philosophical commonsense. But 
still, we have already seen that denying them has its costs, for there are a priori reasons to 
take them seriously, and venerable metaphysical theories—and perhaps also physical 
theories—that seem to entail them. Denying either or both comes at a price. So our 
original puzzle is solvable, but it leaves us with a difficult choice. And perhaps we should 
have expected nothing less, for rarely in philosophy do we get everything we want.28 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Perhaps another possible solution is to deny that multilocated objects can have 
different intrinsic properties at their disjoint exact locations (as Joshua Spencer pointed 
out to me, this is issue is very similar to the debate about whether extended simples can 
be heterogeneous). This would create problems for some of the candidate cases of 
multilocation listed in the text, such as backward time-travelers.  
28 Thanks to Joshua Spencer, who helped to develop the colocation puzzle and served as a 
mentor throughout this project. His suggestions show up throughout the paper in too 
many places to tag individually. Thanks also to Cody Gilmore, Stan Husi, William 
Wainwright, Blain Neufeld, and the participants in Blain’s 2016 writing workshop for 
helpful discussion. And thanks to various referees for comments on the manuscript.  
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